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1. Introduction
Strategy formation can be an intentional and deliberate pro-
cess wherein organizations create future-oriented plans that 
are aimed at exploiting opportunities in accordance with the 
mission of the organization (Newman and Logan, 1981: 7). 
Strategy formation can also occur in a less formalized way. 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) conceptualize strategy formation 
as falling on a spectrum, where one extreme is purely emer-
gent and the other extreme is purely planned. A purely emer-
gent strategy is defined as one where there is “order—consis-
tency in action over time—in the absence of intention about 
it”; a purely planned strategy must meet three requirements: 
explicit articulation of intention, the commonality of inten-
tions amongst actors, and intentions carried out exactly as 
planned (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Organizations rarely 
utilize these pure forms of strategy formation; rather, most 
strategies lie somewhere between these extremes on the strat-
egy formation continuum. Moreover, according to Mintzberg 
(1994: 111), “all viable strategies have emergent and deliberate 
[i.e., planned] qualities.”
Planned strategies have been extensively studied. Research 
has examined the antecedents to planning (Harris and Og-
bonna, 2006) as well as planning’s relationship to firm perfor-
mance (Miller and Cardinal, 1994). Studies exploring the rela-
tionship between planning and performance have produced 
conflicting results. For example, Miller and Cardinal (1994) 
find a positive relationship in their overview of the literature, 
while Greenley (1994) posit that no such conclusion about this 
relationship can be established from his review of 29 stud-
ies. Boyd (1991) conducted a meta-analysis of 29 studies, and 
though he found a modest positive relationship, he notes that 
there are numerous measurement errors in the studies, mak-
ing them generally unreliable.
Recently, emergent strategies—including those that en-
tail emergent qualities but are not explicitly labeled “emer-
gent” (e.g., flexible strategies)—have received increased at-
tention and advocacy (Dreyer & Grønhaug, 2004; Shimizu & 
Hitt, 2004). Unlike research on planned strategies, few stud-
ies to date have explored the performance effects associated 
with more emergent strategies (for exceptions, see Dreyer & 
Grønhaug, 2004; Rudd et al., 2008). Rarer still are studies that 
examine the performance effects of strategy formation mode 
when emergent and planned strategies are recognized as two 
ends of a continuum (for exceptions, see Harrington et al., 
2004; Slevin & Covin, 1997).
The purpose of the current research is to contribute to the 
scholarly conversation regarding the relationship between 
strategy formation mode and firm performance by modeling 
this relationship in manners consistent with Mintzberg’s (1994) 
observations that (1) emergent and planned strategy formation 
modes are two ends of a strategy formation continuum and 
(2) all viable strategies have emergent and planned qualities. 
The departure here from past research is that prior research 
has sought to find a main effect on firm performance for ei-
ther planned strategies or, to a lesser extent, emergent strate-
gies. This either–or characterization does not align with Mint-
zberg’s (1994) observations on the manner in which strategy is 
manifest in organizations. Moreover, assuming that Mintzberg 
(1994: 111) is correct that “all viable strategies have emergent 
and deliberate [i.e., planned] qualities,” prior research focused 
solely on the performance effects of either planned or emer-
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gent strategies will not have captured the strategy formation 
quality argued by Mintzberg (1994) to be most strongly asso-
ciated with firm success – that is, the concurrent exhibition of 
planned and emergent strategic elements.
2. Theoretical development and hypotheses
2.1. The research model
The research model for this study is shown in Figure 1. Firm 
growth, represented by sales growth rate, is the dependent vari-
able of this study for several reasons. First, sales growth rate 
is a commonly used performance measure in the planning lit-
erature (Boyd, 1991). The frequent adoption of this variable as 
a desirable performance metric is attributable to the facts that 
(1) growth is an indicator of the effectiveness with which firms 
exploit current or new product-market opportunities and (2) 
growth is a recognized generator of organizational slack, which 
can buffer firms against environmental shocks and, thereby, 
contribute to sustained organizational viability (see Shepherd 
and Wiklund, 2009). Moreover, growth-related measures tend 
to be more readily available and reliable than performance mea-
sures focused on efficiency concerns, such as ROA (He and 
Wong, 2004). This last point is an important consideration when 
secondary data are to be used to corroborate primary data, as 
was the researchers’ intent in the current study.
The independent variable in this study is strategy formation 
mode, conceptualized as Mintzberg conceived it—strategy for-
mation mode exists on a continuum where one end is purely 
emergent and the other end is purely planned. There are two 
moderating variables proposed in this study: long-range ob-
jective setting (LROS) and forecasting. LROS refers to organi-
zations creating goals and objectives to achieve in the future, 
and forecasting refers to predicting market, competitive, and 
environmental changes and trends. Because previous theoriz-
ing suggests that both LROS and forecasting can operate as an-
tecedents to a planning orientation (e.g., Bracker and Pearson, 
1986), the research model reflects this likelihood. However, be-
cause the principal focus of this article relates to strategy forma-
tion mode and the strategic processes that may facilitate or at-
tenuate its effectiveness, the possible main effects of LROS and 
forecasting on strategy formation mode are not hypothesized.
Emergent strategies have been recognized in recent years 
as a normative state (Shimizu and Hitt, 2004)—a recognition 
that planned strategies once had (Mintzberg, 1994). However, 
emergent strategies can be potentially hazardous as they may 
make firms subject to strategic drift or noncumulative strate-
gic opportunism (Idenburg, 1993). As Slevin and Covin (1997: 
202) state, “…arguments that one strategy formation approach 
is inherently (emphasis added) superior to the other…appear 
moot.” In that article, Slevin and Covin study the impact that 
the external environment and firm structure have on the strat-
egy formation mode–firm performance relationship. Con-
trary to previous theoretical assumptions, the authors propose 
(and find) that planned strategies are more positively related 
to firm performance in hostile environments, and when the 
firm has a mechanistic structure. Conversely, emergent strat-
egies tended to be more positively related to firm performance 
in benign environments, and when the organization has an 
organic structure. The authors argue that, in hostile environ-
ments, poor decisions may have dire consequences, while 
firms in benign environments may benefit from a “learn as 
you go” orientation, as any given strategic misstep would not 
likely produce unforgiving results.
While the environment is an important contingency factor 
in strategy formation mode research, it is not the focus of the 
current research. Instead, this paper explores the strategic pro-
cesses that facilitate success among firms with variously emer-
gent/planned strategies across environmental settings (af-
ter controlling for environmental effects). It is suggested here 
that LROS and forecasting are two strategic processes that 
can moderate the effectiveness of particular strategy forma-
tion modes. Long-range objectives represent beacons toward 
which an organization can navigate. The utility of such objec-
tives rests on their accuracy; stated differently, uninformed 
objectives could prove detrimental, rather than beneficial, to 
firm growth. It is argued here that forecasting future changes 
and trends can help the firm create viable long-range objec-
tives, which may be especially beneficial to firms that exhibit 
particular strategy formation modes.
2.2. Strategy formation mode and firm growth
Slevin and Covin (1997) drew a conceptual link between emer-
gent and planned strategy and rationality in strategic decision 
making processes, where planned strategies reflect decisions 
in the rational mode and emergent strategies reflect bounded 
rationality. The concept of bounded rationality—and how it 
applies to emergent strategy—is further illustrated by Mintz-
berg: “Smart strategists appreciate that they cannot always be 
smart enough to think through everything in advance” (1987: 
69). This does not imply that planned strategies are created 
with full rationality; instead, for a purely planned strategy to 
be realized as intended, there must be knowledge and con-
trol of exactly how the strategy will interact with other forces 
within and outside of the organization (Mintzberg and Wa-
ters, 1985). An additional conceptual link can be drawn be-
tween emergent strategy and strategic flexibility, which can be 
defined as the ability to identify major changes in the environ-
ment, to commit new resources in response to change, and to 
halt and reverse potentially unproductive commitments (Shi-
mizu and Hitt, 2004). Emergent strategies emphasize the abil-
ity to adapt and “change course” when needed (Covin, Green, 
and Slevin, 2006).
Research in the strategy formation literature includes other 
factors that differentiate strategy formation processes. For ex-
Figure 1. Research model.
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ample, Harrington (2005) includes an individualistic/collectiv-
istic dimension, where “individualistic” refers to only the CEO 
or top executives participating in the strategy making process, 
whereas “collectivistic” refers to broad involvement through-
out the hierarchy. In his study of major oil companies, Grant 
(2003) proposes the concept of “planned emergence,” where 
planning occurs “bottom-up” (considered an emergent qual-
ity), while corporate management creates and maintains a sys-
tem of constraints and guidelines via mission statements, per-
formance expectations, and corporate initiatives (considered 
a planned quality). While Grant’s (2003) work examines deci-
sion-making structure as an indication of emergent or planned 
qualities, the current paper focuses on the extent to which firm 
strategies are planned in advance of actions taken as a de-
fining quality of the strategy formation process. Thus, while 
there are similarities between the current research and that of 
Harrington and Grant, this paper offers a unique contribution 
by focusing on the level of strategic decision predetermination 
in the strategy formation process itself, rather than the deci-
sion-making structures utilized by the organization.
The critiques of formal, planned strategy are well articulated 
and plentiful. One of the main criticisms for planned strategy is 
that it is conducive to rigidity, and can therefore prevent organi-
zations from exploring innovations not a part of the plan (Miller 
and Cardinal, 1994). Explicitly planned strategies can act as 
“blinders designed to focus direction and block out peripheral vi-
sion” (Mintzberg, 1990: 184). Planned strategies that do not leave 
room for adaptability may not be able to exploit underestimated 
opportunities because resources are committed elsewhere—
namely, to overestimated opportunities (Covin et al., 2006).
Further, an operational precept of purely planned strat-
egies is that accurate forecasts can be made, an assumption 
that denies the reality of uncertainty. According to Mintzberg, 
“While certain repetitive patterns, such as seasons, may be 
predictable, the forecasting of discontinuities…is virtually im-
possible” (1994: 110). Uncertainty is, by definition, not some-
thing that can be accurately planned for with confidence. As-
suming knowledge of the unknown is “…the perfect way to 
sail straight into an iceberg” (Mintzberg, 1987: 26). Another 
danger of forming explicit plans involves the psychological ef-
fect it has on the planners. Specifically, decision-making that 
underestimates the level of uncertainty the organization faces 
could lead to overconfidence in judgment (Hogarth, 1975), as 
well as engender a superficial and false sense of understand-
ing (Mintzberg, 1990). Lastly, carefully-devised plans will pro-
duce superior performance only if a firm is able to successfully 
implement the plan (Noble, 1999). However, given the afore-
mentioned considerations of uncertainty, it is likely that plan 
modification will be necessary to assure firm success.
The disadvantages of planned strategies can serve as bases of 
advantage for emergent strategies. Emergent strategies are con-
ducive to flexibility and adaptability, which can enable firms to 
reallocate resources mid-stream from opportunities with little 
promise to those with greater promise, allowing firms to act more 
innovatively (Tuominen, Rajala, and Möller, 2004). Organizations 
that utilize emergent strategy formation modes benefit from the 
acquisition and utilization of real-time knowledge that can help 
them respond to changing environmental and organizational de-
mands (Covin et al., 2006). For organizations that actively seek to 
innovate, an emergent strategy formation mode can be critical: 
“…emergent strategies can enable entrepreneurial firms to retain 
the strategic flexibility they need to successfully operate under 
conditions where the most defensible strategic paths are not eas-
ily knowable yet significant losses and opportunity costs may be 
incurred if the wrong strategic path is chosen” (Covin et al., 2006: 
62). As demonstrated above, the virtues of emergent strategies—
flexibility and adaptability—have been extolled extensively in 
previous literature. Nonetheless, organizations that utilize purely 
emergent strategy formation modes may find themselves being 
too reactive and ad hoc in their actions. Purely emergent strategy 
may lead to haphazard guess work that creates misalignment be-
tween the organization and the environment (Armstrong, 1982).
In short, unique liabilities are associated with both emer-
gent and planned strategies. As indicated by Mintzberg (1994), 
neither purely emergent nor purely planned strategies will 
maximize firm performance. Instead, every viable strategy 
should have some degree of both modes: “…all must combine 
some degree of flexible learning with some degree of cerebral 
control” (Mintzberg, 1994: 111). It is with this in mind that the 
first hypothesis is proposed:
H1. The relationship between strategy formation mode and 
sales growth rate is curvilinear (inverse U-shaped) such 
that sales growth rate is highest at a midpoint on the emer-
gent-to-planned strategy formation mode continuum.
2.3. The joint interaction of forecasting and long-range 
objective-setting on the strategy formation mode-firm  
growth relationship
As previously mentioned, this research explores the strategic 
processes that facilitate the success of particular strategy for-
mation modes. Two strategic processes are investigated here: 
forecasting and long-range objective setting (LROS). In this 
study, forecasting is defined as the process through which 
market, competitive, and environmental changes and trends 
are predicted. LROS is defined as the process through which 
explicit objectives or goals are set for the organization. These 
two strategic processes were chosen for examination for two 
principal reasons. First, along with strategy formation mode, 
forecasting and LROS constitute core aspects of the means 
through which purpose and direction are established by or-
ganizations. As such, some of the most important elements 
of what strategic management practice “looks like” in organi-
zations can be revealed via examination of these three strate-
gic variables. Second, and as detailed more specifically below, 
forecasting and LROS are expected to interrelate with strat-
egy formation mode such that the efficacy of particular strat-
egy formation processes will be contingent upon how or how 
well the other processes are executed. For example, forecasting 
can used to establish or verify the appropriateness of strategic 
objectives, and the presence of empirically-informed strategic 
objectives may, in turn, have various utility among firms that 
employ different strategy formation modes.
The first strategic process examined in this study is LROS, 
which is operationalized as the setting of explicit future objec-
tives concerning the firm’s capital budgets, finances, and mar-
ket development. This operationalization does not include 
identification of the means through which the organization ac-
complishes those objectives. The setting of long-range objec-
tives establishes, in essence, the beacons toward which orga-
nizations sail. An emergent strategy formation mode allows 
the firm to adaptively and flexibly sail towards the beacon; 
obstacles—or opportunities—that arise along the way can be 
evaded or pursued to increase the likelihood of attaining the 
objective. Conversely, if the organization utilizes a planned 
strategy to arrive at the goal—that is, the organization sets the 
objective and then explicitly plots a course toward the bea-
con—the set path may prove perilous, but the lack of flexi-
bility and adaptability may cause the organization to stay on 
course and sail “straight into an iceberg” (Mintzberg, 1987: 
26). The current research does not examine the influence of 
LROS alone on the strategy formation mode–firm growth rela-
tionship. Instead, a second strategic process, forecasting, is ex-
amined concurrently with LROS, as it will be argued that fore-
casting can help inform the creation of viable objectives.
Organizations can engage in forecasting in an attempt to 
better understand how to adapt to a continually evolving com-
petitive environment. Generally, forecasting is used to un-
derstand how a particular set of circumstances will affect the 
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organization. Central to the concept of forecasting is the ar-
gument that firm performance is affected by an organiza-
tion’s ability to anticipate environmental changes and allocate 
resources accordingly. However, forecasting should not be 
viewed as an invariably useful activity. Organizations that en-
gage in forecasting are susceptible to biases that could lead to 
inaccurate predictions and, therefore, lower performance. For 
example, Durand (2003) discusses two potential causes of fore-
casting bias: the illusion of control and attention issues.
The illusion of control bias has significant implications for 
organizations, particularly those utilizing planned strategies. 
This bias concerns the positive misconception of control—the 
belief that an entity has control when it does not—and leads 
to the inaccurate assessment of risks. The greater the percep-
tion of control over a given event, the greater the probability 
of underestimating the risks involved with that event (Durand, 
2003). Organizations pursuing emergent strategies may be less 
likely to fall prey to illusions of control. Indeed, emergent strat-
egies are sensitive to the idea that the organization cannot con-
trol the future and therefore must approach it flexibly. On the 
other hand, organizations that utilize highly planned strategies 
may be particularly susceptible to perceiving a greater amount 
of control over the environment than they actually have.
Attention issues are the other source of bias Durand (2003) 
discusses. This bias relates to where organizations invest their 
attention when engaging in forecasting activities—toward in-
ternal or external matters. According to Durand (2003), fore-
casting will be most beneficial for those firms that invest more 
heavily in externally-oriented information (e.g., market re-
search) than internally-oriented information (e.g., employee 
education). It should be noted here that this article’s usage of 
the forecasting construct focuses on external information.
Earlier in this article, Mintzberg (1994) was quoted regard-
ing his view on forecasting. Specifically, he states that the fore-
casting of “discontinuities…is virtually impossible” (1994: 
110). The context of his argument deals with the fallacy of as-
suming that the world will “hold still” during the planning 
process, and then formulating plans based on these static-
world assumptions. The argument proposed in this article is 
that, for firms that utilize emergent strategies, there is greater 
sensitivity to the dynamic nature of the environment. As such, 
there is a lower probability of the firm succumbing to the “fal-
lacy of prediction” discussed by Mintzberg (1994).
It is herein argued that when LROS and forecasting are used 
in concert they will modify the relationship between strategy 
formation mode and firm growth most strongly. Specifically, 
among firms that actively engage in forecasting, long-range 
objectives will be empirically-informed and viable. Forecast-
ing, therefore, serves the function of informing the creation of 
viable objectives. In such circumstances, the adaptability of an 
emergent strategy formation mode will prove beneficial to the 
firm, as forecasting and LROS imbue a form of “cerebral con-
trol,” while the emergent strategy formation mode will allow 
for adaptive learning. Stated differently, organizations that cre-
ate goals and objectives based on forecasts that anticipate envi-
ronmental and competitive changes and trends are more likely 
to create viable, attainable goals than those organizations that 
do not engage in such forecasting. To continue the allegorical 
imagery used in this article, forecasting can be conceptualized 
as a process utilized to help create viable beacons. Organiza-
tions that sail toward these beacons should do so adaptively, as 
the best path toward the beacon may not be clear until the jour-
ney is underway. The following hypothesis is proposed:
H2a. Among firms that actively engage in forecasting, an emer-
gent (planned) strategy formation mode is more positively 
(negatively) related to sales growth rate when the firm pre-
pares explicit long-range objectives than when they do not.
Conversely, among firms that do not actively engage in fore-
casting, emergent strategy will not be as positively related to 
firm growth when LROS is practiced. This is because objectives 
that are created without being informed by forecasts may prove 
inaccurate; in such a case, these objectives may be detrimental 
to firms, and there will be a lack of needed direction in the orga-
nization’s strategic maneuvers. The absence of forecasting will 
result in potentially misinformed objectives that can lead firms 
with emergent strategies to falter. Significantly, among firms 
with planned strategies the need for emphasizing both fore-
casting and LROS may not be as great nor as strong a determi-
nant of firm growth because the joint exhibition of forecasting 
and LROS may suggest that the illusion of control bias (Durand, 
2003) is operating among these firms. Moreover, consistent with 
Mintzberg’s (1994) observation that a planning orientation can 
diminish firm adaptability, the joint exhibition of forecasting 
and LROS among planned strategy firms can crystallize com-
mitment to predetermined courses of action and diminish re-
ceptiveness to environmental feedback which conflicts with a 
priori assumptions. The following hypothesis is proposed:
H2b. Among firms that do not actively engage in forecasting, 
an emergent (planned) strategy formation mode is more 
positively (negatively) related to sales growth rate when 
the firms do not prepare explicit long-range objectives than 
when they do.
3. Methods
3.1. Sample and data collection
Data were collected in cooperation with and under the partial 
sponsorship of the Southwestern Pennsylvania Industrial Re-
source Center—a regional economic development organization. 
A total of 418 firms were selected utilizing this organization’s 
census of businesses in the Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Vir-
ginia region, using the criteria that they be nondiversified busi-
ness units that are manufacturing based and have 50 or more 
employees. Diversified firms were excluded from the sample 
because they might employ different strategic processes across 
their product lines or business units, which would confound re-
sults. By focusing on manufacturing-based organizations, the 
study controlled for macro-industry effects through the elimi-
nation of multiple and diverse industry sectors from the sam-
ple. Finally, by selecting only firms with 50 or more employ-
ees, predictable size-related biases on the research variables 
were avoided (e.g., smaller firms characteristically exhibit more 
emergent strategy-formation patterns; Mintzberg, 1973).
Two questionnaires were mailed to the senior-most execu-
tive, considered the primary respondent, of each of the 418 firms 
selected for the study as described above. This individual was 
asked to complete a questionnaire personally as well as to refer 
the second questionnaire to another senior executive who would 
serve as a secondary respondent. The second individual was to 
be selected on the basis of that individual’s overall understand-
ing of the business and level of involvement in the firm’s strategic 
processes. The secondary respondents’ data were used solely for 
measure corroboration and reliability purposes.
This research drew an organizational response rate of 
27.5% (115 responses from the 418 selected firms), with us-
able responses being received from 115 primary respondents 
and 55 secondary respondents. This study utilized informa-
tion from 103 of these firms, as only these firms had complete 
data available on all of the study’s measures. The diversity of 
this final sample is reflected in the 74 different 4-digit stan-
dard industrial classification (SIC) codes among the 103 firms, 
with no identical SIC code being represented by more than six 
firms. Sixty-four of the 103 firms were privately owned, while 
39 were publicly owned. The average sales revenue and age of 
the firms in the sample were $132.3 million (SD = $435.73 mil-
lion) and 47.6 years (SD = 30.70 years), and the average num-
ber of employees among these firms was 793.8 (SD = 2,447.13). 
450 ti t u s,  co v i n,  & sl e v i n i n Jo u r n a l o f Bu s i n e s s  re s e a r c h 64 (2011) 
t-test comparisons of the average size (computed by both 
number of employees and annual sales) and age of the re-
sponding firms with the same data for non-responding firms 
(where available from secondary sources such as Ward’s Busi-
ness Directory of U.S. Private and Public Companies) showed 
no significant differences (p > .10) between the two groups. t-
test comparisons of early respondents (those firms that re-
turned the questionnaires without second contact) and the late 
respondents (those who replied after the second telephone 
contact) also revealed no significant differences between the 
two groups in number of employees, annual sales revenue, 
firm age, or any of the other research variables of interest to 
this study. In all cases, the t-value was less than 1.50 (p > .10).
3.2. Measures
3.2.1. Sales growth rate
Firm performance was measured as a firm’s sales growth rate 
relative to its industry, and was operationalized as the firm’s 
average rate of growth in sales revenue over its most recent 
3-year period. In those cases where secondary sales revenue 
data were available (25 of the firms), the primary and second-
ary numbers matched each other or were rounded approxi-
mations of each other. The correlation between the firms’ ac-
tual, year-to-year sales figures and the self-reported three-year 
average sales growth rates was r = .85. To account for differ-
ing growth rates in the industries represented in the sample, 
the 3-year average industry growth rate for each firm was sub-
tracted from the firm’s 3-year average growth rate. This cre-
ated an industry-controlled relative sales growth rate figure 
which was used as the dependent variable.
3.2.2. Strategy formation mode
Slevin and Covin’s (1997) 5-item, 7-point scale was used to mea-
sure the construct of strategy formation mode. A low score on 
this scale indicates an emergent strategy pattern, while a higher 
score indicates a planned or intended strategy orientation.
3.2.3. Forecasting
This construct was measured using a 3-item, 7-point scale de-
veloped for this study. The items in this scale assessed how ac-
tively the organization engages in the forecasting of market, 
competitive, and general environmental changes and trends. 
A high score on this scale indicates that the firm actively en-
gages in forecasting activities.
3.2.4. Long-range objective setting
This construct was measured using a 3-item, 7-point scale de-
veloped for this study. The items in this scale assessed degree 
of emphasis placed on the development of explicit, long-term 
(3 years or more) financial, market development, and capital 
budget objectives. A high score on this scale indicates greater 
emphasis on LROS.
3.2.5. Control variables
Firm size and age were controlled because of the expectation 
that the strategic processes of interest might vary systemat-
ically with these variables (e.g., Mintzberg, 1973). Firm size 
was assessed as the number of employees, and firm age was 
assessed as the number of years the firm had been in business. 
Environmental dynamism and hostility were treated as con-
trol variables due to the recognition that the environment has 
been found to influence the efficacy of particular strategy for-
mation patterns (e.g., Miller and Cardinal, 1994). Dynamism 
was measured using a slightly modified version of Miller and 
Friesen’s (1982) 5-item, 7-point scale. Higher scores reflected 
more dynamic environments. Hostility was measured using 
Slevin and Covin’s (1997) 6-item, 7-point scale. Higher scores 
reflected more hostile environments. Finally, due to the recog-
nition that strategy takes time to manifest (Brews and Hunt, 
1999), dummy variables were added that address change in 
strategic management practices over the last three years in 
regards to (1) “futurity”—how far into the future top-level 
managers look to anticipate market conditions and (2) “time 
involvement”—the amount of time top managers spend ana-
lyzing key operating and strategic decisions. These variables 
were measured on a 7-point scale in which 4 represents “no 
change” over the last three years. The absolute value of the de-
viation from a response representing “no change” was used as 
the change score for the variables. These change scores were 
treated as controls in the analyses, the assumption being that 
firms that have changed their futurity or time involvement 
may be executing the specific strategic processes observed in 
the current study differently at the time of the data collection 
relative to three years prior, thereby undermining the causal 
chain on which the current research model is based.
3.3. Analytical techniques and tests for common method bias
The hypotheses in this study were tested using hierarchical re-
gression analysis, as recommended by Arnold (1982). Natural 
logs were used for firm size and age in order to normalize the 
distribution of these variables as they were somewhat skewed. 
To minimize correlations between the independent variables 
and their interaction terms, the independent variables were 
centered as recommended by Aiken and West (1991) prior to 
the computations involving the interaction terms. Variance in-
flation factors (VIFs) were computed for all independent vari-
ables, including the interaction terms, in the regression equa-
tions. The highest VIF was 3.33, within the accepted range of 
10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 1998), indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in the current analyses.
To check for the presence of possible common method bias 
in the results, a technique described by Podsakoff et al. (2003) 
was utilized. This technique tests the effect of a latent methods 
factor, which captures common methods variance, on the cor-
relations among the research variables. The result of this anal-
ysis suggested that common methods effects, if present, do not 
materially impact the findings of the current research.
4. Results
Table 1 shows the summary statistics and correlation matrix for 
the measures used. The research model shown in Figure 1 indi-
cates that LROS and forecasting may operate as antecedents to 
strategy formation mode. Although these specific relationships 
were not formally hypothesized, a regression analysis was con-
ducted which revealed that LROS and forecasting are, in fact, sig-
nificantly (at the p < .001 and p < .01 levels, respectively) and pos-
itively associated with strategy formation mode.
Table 2 presents the regression results. The significant (p < .05) 
and negative beta for the strategy formation mode squared term 
shown in Model 2 is consistent with Hypothesis 1; it indicates a 
curvilinear relationship between strategy formation mode and 
sales growth. The negative beta indicates that the relationship 
looks like an inverted U, denoting that optimal sales growth oc-
curs at a middle point on the strategy formation mode scale.
In Model 4, the negative and significant (p < .01) beta for 
the three-way interaction term supports Hypothesis 2 (i.e., 
both 2a and 2b). The graphical representations for the three-
way interaction are shown in Figure 2A and B. The three-way 
interaction plots were created by splitting the sample by those 
organizations that engage in a “high” or “low” degree of fore-
casting. Figure 2A illustrates the interaction effect on sales 
growth of strategy formation mode and LROS in organiza-
tions that actively engage in forecasting. Consistent with Hy-
pothesis 2a, among firms that actively engage in forecasting, 
emergent (planned) strategies have a more positive (negative) 
relationship with sales growth rate when LROS is empha-
sized. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, Figure 2B shows that 
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for firms that do not actively engage in forecasting, emergent 
(planned) strategies are more positively (negatively) related to 
sales growth rate when LROS is not emphasized.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
There are two primary theoretical implications of this study. 
First, this study suggests that, consistent with Mintzberg’s 
(1994) observations on effective strategy formation pro-
cesses, neither purely emergent nor purely planned strategies 
should be regarded as inherently desirable. Rather, the opti-
mal amount of planning orientation, as exhibited on an emer-
gent-to-planned strategy continuum, likely occurs at some 
midpoint on that continuum. The observed curvilinear rela-
tionship between strategy formation mode and firm growth 
rate indicates that growth is highest when the firm’s strategy 
exhibits both emergent and planned qualities. While this em-
pirical finding is consistent with prior theorizing, no prior re-
search has empirically tested for the aforementioned curvi-
linear relationship. The significance of this finding becomes 
apparent when one considers the strong advocacy often seen 
in the popular business press of strategic management ap-
proaches that embrace flexibility and adaptability over plan-
ning (e.g., D’Aveni and Gunther, 1994). This “new” approach 
to strategic management is no more enlightened than the tra-
ditional planning approaches commonly extolled in the clas-
sic business planning literature (e.g., Andrews, 1971; An-
soff, 1965). Future theorists may be well advised to refrain 
from framing their ideas about effective strategy formation 
processes as involving an emergent strategy orientation or a 
planned strategy orientation and, instead, recognize the cen-
trality to firm success of having both orientations.
A second theoretical implication of this research is that the 
way in which the strategy formation process is paired with 
other strategic processes—namely, forecasting and LROS—
can have significant performance-related effects for firms. It 
was previously argued that forecasting can empirically inform 
the creation of viable long-range objectives, which can then be 
set as beacons toward which the firm navigates. Nonetheless, 
the current findings suggest that the utility of concurrently 
stressing forecasting and LROS is greater among firms with 
emergent than planned strategy orientations. Among firms 
with emergent strategies, the exhibition of forecasting and 
LROS may create a needed and informed sense of purpose 
that leads the firm in empirically defensible directions. How-
ever, forecasting may not as strongly influence the efficacy 
of LROS among firms with planned strategies, because such 
firms may be less likely to question the veracity of objectives 
whose establishment has been empirically informed through 
forecasting. The empirical defensibility of pairing formal fore-
casting and objective setting among firms with a planning ori-
entation may result from and contribute to a deterministic 
mindset in which the firm believes it has more control over its 
destiny than it actually does. In other words, a concurrent em-
phasis on forecasting, LROS, and planned strategies may be a 
perfect recipe for creating the aforementioned illusion of con-
trol bias (Durand, 2003). Consequently, firms that employ this 
mixture of strategic processes may be reluctant to ever deviate 
from their plans, even when such deviation is warranted.
There are two primary managerial implications of this re-
search. First, neither strategy formation mode is the inherently 
superior path to creating effective strategy. Purely emergent 
strategies can lead to reactive, overly ad hoc, and non-pur-
poseful strategies. Though flexibility is an often-lauded stra-
tegic virtue, it can prove unbeneficial to organizations. Indeed, 
if an organization changes course too frequently, or changes 
course for the sake of change alone, there will be undesirable 
consequences (Parnell, 1994). Likewise, a strong planning ori-
entation, particularly when paired with empirical evidence 
that prior objectives were established based on the best avail-
able data, may contribute to a false sense of control and, per-
haps, an unwillingness or inability to learn from past strategic 
missteps (Mintzberg, 1990).
Table 1. Summary statistics and correlation matrix (N = 103).
Variable Mean s.d. α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Sales growth rate −1.1 14.73 n.a.         
2. Firm size 793.8 2447.13 n.a. 0.13        
3. Firm age 47.6 30.70 n.a. −0.08 0.21*       
4. Env. dynamism 4.0 1.10 0.71 0.07 0.16 −0.16      
5. Env. hostility 4.3 0.96 0.67 −0.06 −0.18 −0.14 0.18     
6. Change in futurity 4.2 1.29 n.a. 0.10 −0.13 0.21* −0.12 −0.31**    
7. Change in time involvement 4.9 1.16 n.a. −0.16 0.06 0.07 −0.02 −0.06 0.46**   
8. Strategy formation mode 4.1 1.34 0.89 0.07 0.34** 0.12 0.18 −0.01 0.31** 0.28**  
9. Forecasting 3.9 1.55 0.89 0.09 0.27** 0.15 −0.01 −0.15 0.20* 0.25* 0.54** 
10. Long−range objective setting 3.8 1.84 0.87 −0.04 0.31** 0.33** 0.15 −0.18 0.37** 0.26** 0.62** 0.59**
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01
Table 2. Regression results.
DV: Sales Growth                     Model:  1  2  3  4
Step 1: Control variables
Log firm age −.076 −.079 −.079 −.084
Log firm size −.037 −.003 .000 .011
Environmental dynamism .100 .101 .085 .114
Environmental hostility −.085 −.101 −.076 −.083
Change in futurity .058 .089 .039 .053
Change in time involvement −.096 −.116 −.112 −.092
Step 2: Independent variable
Strategy formation mode .102 .616 .094 .195
Step 3: Independent variable2    
SFM2  −.232* −.160 −.091
Step 4: Moderator variables
Forecasting   .092 .238†
Long-Range Objective Setting (LROS)   −.153 −.043
Step 5: Two-way interaction terms
Forecasting × SFM   −.266 −.444*
LROS × SFM   .041 .003
LROS × Forecasting   .221 .226
Step 6: Three-way interaction
LROS × Forecasting × SFM    
−.491**
Model R2 .031 .081 .129 .216
Change in R2  .050 .048 .087
Model F .432 1.045 1.011 1.728†
Standardized regression coefficients are reported.
† p < .10 ; * p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; N = 103
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The second managerial implication of this research is that 
executives should be amenable to allowing their firms’ strat-
egies to evolve, but only when those firms exhibit purposeful 
strategic behavior that directs the firm toward well-considered 
ends. Stated differently, strategic flexibility must be recog-
nized as a complement to—not a substitute for—clear direc-
tionality and purposefulness vis-à-vis empirically-derived ob-
jectives. The presence of such objectives can help insure that 
strategies unfold in manners that best enable the firm to incre-
mentally navigate toward strategic positions explicitly recog-
nized as desirable. In short, prior research suggests that stra-
tegic planning should be tempered with operational flexibility 
in order to promote firm performance (Rudd et al., 2008). This 
research offers the complementary perspective that emergent 
strategies may best promote performance when they unfold in 
the presence of explicit, empirically-derived objectives.
In conclusion, the increasingly dynamic nature of the mod-
ern competitive environment necessitates close examination of 
the strategic processes through which organizations can suc-
ceed. Work in both the popular press and more scientific lit-
erature tends to propose that control is had at the expense of 
adaptability, or adaptability at the expense of control. This ar-
ticle seeks to challenge this assumption by exploring how cer-
tain strategic processes may be utilized to imbue control in 
emergent strategies and, conversely, how these same pro-
cesses may impede the effectiveness of planned strategies. 
Though forecasting and long-range objective setting may pre-
vent some firms from succumbing to strategic drift and non-
purposefulness, they may cause other firms to put greater faith 
into the appropriateness of their strategic actions than is war-
ranted, prompting strategic rigidity. Firms that learn how to 
effectively adapt without losing focus, to sail the trade winds 
without becoming lost, will most successfully navigate tumul-
tuous waters.
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